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00:00:00

Squire L. Brown: Today is August 22, 2006. We are talking with Mr.
William F. Bahret. In his professional career, Mr. Bahret was a specialist
in radar signature phenomenon. At the conclusion of his career, he was
recognized with various awards from professional societies and from the
Air Force for his many contributions to stealth technology. The interview
is being conducted in the studios of the Center for Teaching and Learning
at Wright State University as part of the Cold War Aerospace Technology
History Project. The interviewer is Squire Brown. Thank you very much
for talking with us today, Mr. Bahret.
Mr. Bahret, you were a participant in the development of
technologies for the Air Force during several decades of the Cold War.
Will you please provide a synopsis of your professional career, beginning
with your university education, and perhaps a few comments on why you
chose engineering.

00:01:20

William F. Bahret: Well, as I got out of service at the end of World War
II, I went into school. I graduated from the RCA Institute of Technology
in New York, and after that, I guess, for the next twenty or more years
while I was working, I just kept on going to different schools. I think I’ve
attended almost every one in existence—University of Michigan, Wright
State, Ohio State, University of Dayton, Sinclair. And I think some of it
rubbed off, but probably not as much as could have. But I enjoyed doing
that all the while. Quite often, you know, when you’re working and
you’re busy and you travel, you kind of get a little fouled up in taking
courses, because like I was assigned to a project with Germany and so I
decided why not learn technical German? So AFIT had a three-semester
course. Unfortunately after the first semester, they sent me overseas for
about two weeks, and that was the end of that. So, you know that sort of
thing. But otherwise, it was very good.
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How did I wind up doing this sort of thing? Well, it’s kind of
interesting. I had an uncle who was a two-star general in the Signal Corps,
and, as you know, in the early years, the Air Force was under the Signal
Corps. He actually worked in research at Wright Field, and ever since I
was a little kid I said, “That’s what I want to do.” By golly, I wound up
doing that. So, I guess I was just lucky.
00:03:16

Brown: Had you had a fascination with radio, electromagnetics, from an
early stage, or was that something you just sort of wandered into?

00:03:27

Bahret: Electromagnetics is not something you get a fascination at an
early age. In fact, if you can spell it, you’re doing pretty well. Now that’s
a little tough. But, yes, I was always interested in radio and that sort of
thing. My dad used to piddle around and build crystal sets and things like
that, so, yes, you fiddle around, get shocked now and then, and so forth
and so on. But, you learn.

00:03:57

Brown: Your initial assignment to Wright-Patterson Air Force Base was
to one of the Air Force laboratories. When you arrived there, was it
apparent to you that you were a participant in the Cold War? How did the
laboratory leadership convey to you your role to the nation’s defense?

00:04:20

Bahret: Well, of course, when you work in the laboratory, you know
pretty well that in the normal cycle, it’s forever and a day before
something gets into the inventory, usually. There are exceptions, and
we’ll talk about some of those later. And they were pleasant exceptions.
But generally speaking, you know, we figured, well we’re just going to do
research on things that would make the bad guys life a little more
miserable. I happened to work in the Electronic Warfare division of the
Avionics Lab, as it subsequently became known. And of course in the
Electronic Warfare division, we were doing things that supposedly would
defeat the other guy’s radars or other sensors, and my part in that, of
course, was in radar signature. But there were other people doing jammers
and processors and receivers and so forth and so on. So collectively, we
knew we were trying to beat the other guy, and we had an awful lot of
intelligence information that let us get a clue as to what direction they
were taking.

00:05:45

Brown: Perhaps this would be a good time to ask you to expand upon the
role of intelligence organizations. How did you receive information on
Soviet systems? Who provided that? And was it credible?

00:06:02

Bahret: Actually, we worked extremely closely with what was then called
Foreign Technology Division. They are the people who are responsible
for assessing potential enemy capabilities. As it turned out, many, many
years later, after the Cold War simmered down, we actually got to meet
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some of our counterparts from Russia, and I have to say that all too often
the intelligence assessments were far, far too optimistic in terms of what
they were able to do. I guess it scared a lot of people over here, and
maybe inspired more things, but the fact of that matter was, when I finally
met my counterparts and we sat down and had a big orange together,
turned out they were probably twenty years behind us, at least in the
signature area particularly. I mean, one of—oh, I don’t know if we’re
getting ahead of ourselves, but—for example, everybody says well if you
want to reduce signature, you’ve got to have radar absorbent materials,
magic stuff that just sops up the other guy’s radar, you know.
Well, one of the tricks, one of the difficulties in developing things
like that is measuring the components that you use to make an absorber. It
may not seem like a big thing to you, but let me tell you that we had all
kinds of good arithmetic that we could design the materials. We knew
what to put in them. But, you know, it’s like mother’s recipe for duck
soup, first you have to find the duck! And it’s only when we learned how
to make good measurements of materials’ properties were we able to
actually make a design that was mathematically possible. And we could
do it predictably. We never failed after that. But they never got to that
point. They had, the fellows I met, they had techniques for measuring
materials that were, well, they were the crudest. They were at our starting
point twenty years earlier, when we got out there and we didn’t know how
to do it and we fiddled. They were still fiddling when the Cold War
ended. So they would have had troubles.
00:08:49

Brown: Let me make sure that I’m clear on your statements here. At the
end of the Cold War when you were able to actually visit the former
Soviet Union—today, Russia—you were able to ascertain that the Soviets
were perhaps a couple of decades behind the United States, is that correct?

00:09:20

Bahret: Actually, I never did get to visit, but what happened was certain
intelligence agencies after the war, they got some of these people to come
over here. For example, one day I was called and said, “Show up to Ohio
State University.” They were having this fellow from a Soviet research
establishment in Moscow. He was coming over ostensibly to have lunch
and meet the people from Ohio State. In fact, a lot of the people eating
there were not from Ohio State, but that’s another point. But they made
me sit next to him. He spoke excellent English, and we got to talking
about this, that and the other thing, and he showed me some pictures of
their facilities, and they were just terribly, terribly crude. I don’t know
whether this is too technical or not, but one of the things in measuring
material properties, it’s a good thing not to let the edges of a sample
dominate things. And the way you do that is you could put it in a wave
guide or a coaxial line or something like that, and that eliminates the edge.
They still had them on a pole on a flat plate out there in a room like this.
They couldn’t have gotten the right number if they tried for a hundred
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years. And, you know, I didn’t say anything to him, but later the other
people said, you know, “Bahret, what do you think?” I said, “Do you
want to know the truth?” I said, “Yeah, they’re way behind. Way
behind.”
00:11:07

Brown: So in your professional estimate, then, they were still not yet
capable of producing a stealth aircraft?

00:11:16

Bahret: No, no. No, not anything like we could here. You know, that’s
true in most countries I’ve been to, a lot of the NATO countries, for
instance. And, you know, they tell you not to say too much, but keep your
ears and eyes open as usual, and most of them are still struggling. But, on
the other hand, the United States is a pretty big country. And a lot of these
other places—Russia’s is equally big, of course—but France or Germany
or something like there, they’re just a little bit bigger than a state here, so
you really can’t expect them to have either the number of people to think
about it or the resources to attack it.

00:12:14

Brown: Let’s drop back, return to the U.S., with this question please.
You were one of the pioneers in the technology of radar camouflage, later
known as stealth. How were you introduced to the subject? And what
qualifications were necessary to work in that discipline?

00:12:37

Bahret: Actually, the work on stealth was sort of an accident or a byproduct of trying to do other things. As you know, in World War II, radar
became available. People were trying to make magnetrons and klystrons
and all of the kinds of things to make a radar work. They would sit out
there when opposing forces were attacking and they’d look at the radar
and say, “Hmm, isn’t that interesting.” But the fact of the matter was one
of the things in, well, in the radar range equation—which is the thing that
determines the performance of a radar—one of the numbers in there is the
cross-section, the echo size, of a target, be it a tank or a submarine or a
satellite or what. And nobody knew what those numbers were. In fact,
you probably never heard of a guy named Kip Siegell—he was a great
man up at the University of Michigan, and subsequently he had his own
outfit—but Kip once made a statement. He said, “If somebody asked me
what the echo area of a B-25 is,” he said, “I can look in ten books and get
you ten different numbers.” It was that sort of thing. So when I joined the
laboratory, I was assigned to a project where they were trying to learn how
to quantify this magic number. And it isn’t all that easy. Should I speak
about this for a little bit?

00:14:33

Brown: Please do.

00:14:35

Bahret: There are only three ways to determine the radar echo. One is to
calculate it. One, of course, is to measure the actual machine. And the
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third is, perhaps, to use scale models and make a measurement. Well,
measuring the actual machine is jolly, except it is about as useless as air
brakes on a turtle when it comes to designing something, because
obviously to measure it, you have to have it. It’s a done thing.
So what you’re looking for, really, are techniques that permit you
to design something and predict the outcome. Hence, model
measurements or something of that sort, or mathematical techniques are
the ways to go, really. The trouble, however, is that no matter which way
you go, you have to understand how to model the subject, whether it be an
aircraft or satellite or a ship or anything. What about that object creates
the echo? Well, it’s not always obvious. And so what we were doing was
research on those kinds of problems. How do you actually model
something and come up with the right answer? Now, mathematical
techniques are attractive because you don’t have to go to a lot of trouble
with facilities and so forth and so on. But remember back in the ‘50s—
today, to do some of these problems, it could—well, I’ve run programs on
a, on IBM 7090s and big computers that lasted all night long! And I’d get
a call the next day saying, “Bahret, what are you doing here? You tied the
whole facility for the whole thing?” I said, “I’m sorry, but that’s how long
the equations take.” Well picture that, now, twenty years before that, and
say, what could you do? Well, you’re almost like the guy with the abacus
trying to do earthshaking problems. You just can’t do it.
So, really theoretical techniques, people worked on them, and so
forth and so on, but the model techniques were the main focus because
they seemed closest to being realistic and also a much simpler way to get
answers. I compare it, for instance, if you have a flying machine, say a B25, whatever, B-52, if you’re on the ground making measurements, there
are only a certain range of what we call aspect angles that are possible.
Unless you have some kind of a heroic pilot who is likely willing to turn a
B-52 upside down and fly, you can’t get the top of the aircraft, for
instance, if you’re on the ground. Those kind of things come into play,
whereas, if you have models, you can put it on a support any old way you
want. So, again, that’s why model measurements were the focus.
But yet, the question was, what really contributes to the echo?
Now, if you have the actual machine, and you have a good measurement
radar, and you go out and measure it, you can be the village idiot and you
get the right number, because what it is, happens. But if you try to model
that dude, then the question is, what parts are important and what parts are
not? And until you know that answer, you’re going to get the wrong
number. I’ll give you an idea. For instance, you know what a jet tailpipe
with an afterburner in it, it’s got a lot of hardware in there. Well, how
much of that do you really have to model, and how, to get the right
answer, even if you make a scale model? Those kind of things forced us
into studying what made a significant difference and what didn’t. And, for
example, for most jet fighter aircraft, in the frontal sector, which is very
important, the skin and other things like that make no difference at all,
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because the energy that’s hitting those is going elsewhere. Whereas, it
turned out that jet inlets, antennas on the front of the aircraft, the cockpit
canopy and all of that, those were the things that were significant. In fact,
for a lot of planes you could model the aircraft without even putting the
wings on it, if all you want to know is what it looked like in the front,
because two or three major factors dominated the echo, gave it ninety-five
percent of it. And those are the kind of things, we had to find those
things out by trial and error. We had to build a model, and then we’d
make an intake duct or whatever and put a fake engine face in the back
there and we’d get a number and then we’d say, well, is that really
contributing? And we’d take absorber materials and stuff in the hole and
that kind of thing, trial and error. You try to find out what is significant,
and eventually you do.
But it’s not one, a single answer either, because in radar, of course,
you have a tremendous range of frequencies. They go from very low
frequencies, which are generally used for early warning and that sort of
thing, to very high frequencies, which are used for missile guidance, attack
on the, on the aircraft, for instance, if it’s an aircraft. And so you have to
worry about what contributes to the echo at various parts of the spectrum,
and that changes! If you get very, very far down in the frequency
spectrum, the details like a jet engine or an antenna or something, are
trivial. It’s generally the bulk size of the fool thing, you know. I mean a
fighter aircraft will look like cross-dipoles, the wings and so forth and so
on. And so the answer to what contributes to the echo varies with
frequency and with polarization. Radar has polarization just as light does,
and you have to worry about all these things. So there was a lot to do to
answer the question.
But to get back to your first question, how did it wind up doing
signature control, after you began to understand what created the echo,
you’d say, “Hmm, isn’t that interesting? I wonder if we can do something
about that?” And so, you start trying this, that, or the other thing and see
what difference it makes. And that’s where it got very interesting. I’d like
to say too, though, that we had a very small staff, and that meant that
every time we discovered a problem, we didn’t necessarily have the smarts
or the people or anything else to do it ourselves. So what we had to do
then was to go out and hire adjunct to our staff as you will—a contractor
to do this, or something like that. For example, in radar absorber
materials, we’re electromagnetic people, electronics guys, and we didn’t
know diddly about mixing gunk and goos and making absorbers. So we
had to go out and get plastics people, or structures people, and so forth and
so on. And in that process, I might say, in all truth, that the other labs at
the base came into play there, because we weren’t stupid enough to think
we could solve these problems by ourselves, so we’d go over to Flight
Dynamics Laboratory or Materials Laboratory or wherever, and say, “Hey,
smart fellow, would you like to work on something pretty interesting?”
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And so the thing began to grow like topsy because there were so
many facets to it, and it got more and more interesting all the time. For
example, one of the problems had to do with antennas. Now, you talk to
antenna people, strictly antenna people, about this, and they’ll say,
“What’s the problem? I know all about my antenna.” The fact of the
matter is the poor soul doesn’t know diddly about his antenna. He knows
how it works as it was designed to work in a certain narrow part of the
spectrum, but you see the bad guys have the option of using any part of the
spectrum they choose. And you ask most antenna men, “How does that
antenna work at three time the operating frequency? Or ten percent of the
operating frequency?” “Duh.” They just don’t know. They’d never had
to worry about it.
Well, when you get into this day and game, you worry about it.
And it turns out that even though you may have, for instance, an x-band
antenna, ten gigahertz on a radar on an aircraft—common for fighters, for
instance—if the guy, well, what happens if I look at that with twenty
gigahertz? Let me tell you what happens. It looks as big as a house! But
it has nothing to do with the operation of that thing on the aircraft. But we
have to worry about it. So, that’s a big project to try to solve some of
those things, because the last thing in the world that anybody will sit for is
you fouling up their handiwork. And when you come in there and say,
“Well that antenna just won’t do.” They say, “Well, excuse you, we’ll call
you. Don’t call us!” So we had to get people, and that was a long-term
project. I mean this took probably ten or fifteen years to really come up
with a good solution.
00:26:41

Brown: And what time period would this have been—the 1950s, the
1960s?

00:26:47

Bahret: Yes, well, most of the basic problems were identified by the late
1950s. In fact, in the very early 1960s, most people don’t know it but we
retrofit the entire Hound Dog fleet with reduced signature techniques.
And they flew for ten years more with that, and nobody even knew they
were there. In fact, there’s one in the Air Force Museum.

00:27:19

Brown: And the Hound Dog was a missile that went with the B-52
bombers, intended to attack the Soviet Union?

00:27:28

Bahret: True. It was a nuclear-powered, long-range, jet-engine missile,
and it was just like a skinny shape, basically. There was no inlet. There
was no cockpit, no nothing. I don’t mean no inlet. No antenna or
anything like that. It was inertially guided. But there was an inlet. And,
this, you ask, “Well how did this happen?” Well, I can tell you how this
happened.
When we first started to make measurements, we built a facility in
the lab, and people kept coming and saying, “Hey, how about you measure
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our thing,” and so forth and so on. Well, the lab chief came up and said,
“Bahret, you’re supposed to be doing research. You’re not supposed to be
doing routine measurements.” He said, “If all these people want this
work, set up a facility someplace—routine measurement facility—and
we’ll send all the models down there or whatever.” And so it happened.
We got the first facility of the kind was down at Radiation Incorporated,
down in Melbourne, Florida. Out in the middle of their garbage dump, by
the way, to keep it secure.
But anyhow, guy named Jack Copa [name?], he was a captain
down in the Hound Dog SPO at the time. He subsequently got to be the
commander of the system—I mean the space command out on the west
coast—but at the time was a captain, and he came up and said, “Bahret,
you measured our Hound Dog missile, and it looks as big as a fighter
airplane.” He said, “I don’t believe it.” I said, “But, Jack, I didn’t make it
up. We measured it.” “I don’t believe you,” he said. “Okay, Jack, let’s
go.” We went down to Florida, went out in the dump, and we put the
missile up and—bigger than a house! And he said, “Why is that?” I said,
“Because it’s got that big engine inlet.” He says, “Can you prove that?” I
said, “Sure.” I had the guys go out and put a metal cone over the engine
so that nothing got in. It all just scattered. The echo went out of sight,
you know, down. He says, “That’s, that’s amazing.” I said, “No, it’s not.
That’s what should happen.” He said, “What can we do about it?” And I
said, “Well, I think I know how I can do something about it.” So they
subsequently gave a contract to the guy out in Tulsa who was building it,
and they made a fix that went in the engine inlet. Never in fifteen years
did they ever have a downtime on a B-52 because the Hound Dog missile
didn’t work. And by the way, every time the B-52 took off or landed, they
powered up the Hound Dog engines to help. That was reliable.
Well, that got me into trouble, by the way. There was a general
named Egan who was then the head of NORAD, the North American Air
Defense Command out in Colorado Springs. And one day, I was patiently
sitting at my desk doing something, and the secretary came in and said,
“Mr. Bahret, there’s a two-star general at the door, in a flying suit, and he
wants you.” I said, “What I’d do now?” Now at the time, we were in
“The Barn,” which we’ll talk about later, but it’s an obscure building on
the base. And so, he came in, and we sat down. He said, “Bahret,” he
said, “is this Hound Dog really as small as you, as we think?” I said,
“Yeah.” He said, “Well the reason I like to ask you that is because every
once in a while the Air Defense Command fighters used to run intercepts
on them.” They would actually fire a Hound Dog off a B-52. And he
says, “Several times lately, my group has looked up and seen this thing
right in front of their cockpit, and we didn’t like that.” So we talked and
talked. He says, “Okay.” He went away. Well, turned out, you know I
don’t know how he gets friends like this, but he had flown in from
Colorado Springs. He’d gone out to the base and picked up a T-33, flew
in over here at the base, called for a base taxi, got over to my building, got
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the taxi, went back and got in his plane and left. Guess what happened?
We have a thing on the base called protocol. They take a dim view of
two-stars generals running around the base in flying suits without escorts.
And they came up and started to give me grief, you know, and said,
“Bahret, what’s the matter with you? You’re not supposed to have that.”
I said, “Okay. What do you want me to do the next time a two-star
general shows up at the door?” Well, that was the end of that. Lot of fun.
00:32:38

Brown: Again, some questions related to the early years. In the postWorld War II period, immediately after the end of the war, a very
important document was produced, and that would be the report entitled
Toward New Horizons by the Scientific Advisory Group. And the product
of that would really set the research and development agenda for the Air
Force for well into the Cold War. In the section on counter-measures,
there’s an interesting statement on camouflage against detection by radar,
which would suggest that even in those early years that they appreciated
what could be done. And yet it would be some time before stealth
technology would really be a priority. Was it difficult to get the concept
of stealth accepted within the Air Force?

00:33:39

Bahret: I would have to say yes. And I think the reason was that we were
in the laboratories. But there was a whole other organization at Wright
Field called the Systems SPOs, okay. And, generally speaking, they were
run by managers, shall we say, many of them non-technical. They pretty
much listened to their contractors, and their contractors were always
pushing the state of the art just to use techniques that had been known for
years. I mean, you know, they were always asking them to build an
aircraft that flew twice the speed and twice as far and so forth, and they
were pushed just to do that. And they weren’t too anxious to hear some
jerk from the laboratory come along and say, “Well now, boys, we have to
do this.” Okay? So between the SPO mentality and—not that I have
anything against it, you understand, they’ve done remarkable things—but
between that thinking and the contractor influence, there wasn’t a lot of
dancing in the streets over the prospect of having to incorporate this sort
of thing. Took a while.

00:35:19

Brown: Mr. Bahret, we’re going a short break right now, before we
resume the questioning.

00:35:25

Bahret: Okay.

[Recording paused]
00:35:29

22 August 2006

Brown: Mr. Bahret, you’ve spoken about the need for facilities to do this
work. Much of the investigations took place in a building here at Wright-

10

Cold War Aerospace Technology Project

William F. Bahret

Patterson, Building 821, that was known locally as “The Barn” because of
its unique shape. Why was this building chosen?
00:35:55

Bahret: Well, can I tell you an interesting story about the building?

00:35:58

Brown: Please do.

00:35:59

Bahret: We have all kinds of digressions here. As you know, things
sometimes take a long time to be brought to fruition. Now in World War
II, they were developing radars, some of which were fairly large,
physically. Well, doing that out in a rainstorm is not really a good way to
work, so somebody said, “Why don’t we design a building that the radars
can penetrate?” So I don’t remember where, it may have been down at
Naval Research Lab or Pax River or someplace, somebody built a building
out of wood, and it was the same design as, as Building 821. And the Air
Force decided hey, we want one of those, too. So I guess it must have
been in the 1945 or ’44, something like that, they put in to get one. It was
built, finally, in 1948, and by that time, everybody forgot what the devil
they wanted it for! So it lay up on the hill there for a long time empty.
Meantime, we were looking for a wide-open, big building that we
could put facilities in—because you have to have certain amount of room
to do this—to measure aircraft characteristics and materials and other
things. And so we were allowed to move into 821, and we put an anechoic
chamber in there. I wish I had a picture to show you, but by today’s
standards, it’s so crude that people would giggle. But nevertheless it was
the only game in town. It was kind of interesting in a way because the
building was transparent, and, to some degree, and we had kind of
sensitive equipment, had to make it that way deliberately. Well, it turned
out that Building 821 is located right beside what used to be the road to
Wright Field garbage dump. And so we would have a model ballistic
missile nose cone or something up, measuring it, and the garbage truck
would go by on the road. And we found out there wasn’t a lot of call for
data on a ballistic missile with a garbage truck behind it. So we
subsequently had to put metal plates and other things there on the side,
you know, to hide them. How did we get on that? But anyhow, yes, we
moved into the building and subsequently used it for twenty years.

00:39:02

Brown: You mentioned putting anechoic chambers inside the structure.
Can you give a layman’s description of what an anechoic chamber would
be?

00:39:12

Bahret: Yes. The idea, of course, is to keep the surroundings from
entering into the measurement. And that can be tricky because what it
requires is that you build materials that can basically be almost nonreflective. That’s impossible, of course, but what you can do is reduce the
reflection very much. And typically these absorber materials that are used
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in what we call anechoic chambers are pyramidal structures made of
carbon foam and that sort of thing. And if they’re well-designed, you can
cover a wall with this material and reduce the echo from that wall by five
or six orders of magnitude. That’s a lot. And, generally speaking, that’s
fairly effective in this kind of thing. But, you know, it’s expensive to
build these things. These absorber materials, of course, take a lot of work
to build, and then you have to install them in fancy ways and so forth and
so on. Yes, the anechoic chamber and, I might add, the supports for
models were always the subject of continuing worry. Because you see, in
the work of reducing signature, it’s a guaranteed employment type of thing
because every time you know how to get the signature down, then you
have to go back and build a chamber which has lower echoes, then you
can build the signature down, and on ad nauseam, you know. So it’s a lot
of interesting things.
00:41:27

Brown: Let me ask you to make a connection, then, between the work you
previously described—the necessary work of being able to do the
mathematical models and the predictions with the use of the experimental
facilities in The Barn. Was that a direct correlation? Was there a direct tie
between the two?

00:41:47

Bahret: I have to say that because of the computer limitations as well as
limitations on electromagnetic theory, the mathematical approach was
never up to the measurement approach. An example: I’ve been asked to
talk and everything at a lot of big time conferences of electromagnetic’s
theorists. One I recall was one of the University of Illinois in Chicago,
and they had just about everybody you could name who could even spell
electromagnetics. And one night, well, you know, you had canned
speeches and all, this fellow gave his pet theory—and incidentally it’s sort
of a bad thing and I’ve had a thing with the universities over this. If I had
my way, universities would trade professors every once in a while, and the
answer is, what reason why? Because Professor X, he gets on to a certain
approach, and he teaches his students that approach, and they continue that
approach, and that’s that university. Go to another university, it’s the
same, different thing, okay. And what you’d like to have is somebody
who could step in there and compare different ones or combine them or do
something like this, but that’s very hard to happen with the university
system. But that’s another subject.
But anyhow, one evening after the formal hour—anyway, dinner
was over and everything—some of the fellows got me in a little corner of
a small conference room in this big building, and we started talking. And
they wanted to know if I had my druthers, what would theorists really be
worrying about? Well that started at about 7:30, after dinner, and I think
at 11 o’clock, the room was filled, the hall was filled, and all these
people—somehow the word got around—and here was questions and, you

22 August 2006

12

Cold War Aerospace Technology Project

William F. Bahret

know, just like that. And what they were interested in what I thought we
ought to do, but they hadn’t a clue as to how to do it.
And the end, and this is what I’m talking about, theoreticians are
very good at calculating scattering from a surface, but as I’ve said several
times now, the things that cause big echoes are not surfaces, but they are
what we call apertures. Apertures are anything—garbage pail, antenna, an
inlet—that captures energy, and it runs in and around and everything and
comes back out somehow. In apertures—a wave guide is a good
example—there are modes to the way like waves or something like that,
wave structures, you know, that move in the ocean. Well, electromagnetic
waves behave like that when they get into confined spaces. Well, as I said
before, you don’t have to worry about the simple case where like a wave
guide duct is the right size to propagate a certain frequency. What you
have to worry about is a frequency far removed from that. And when that
happens, the mode theory goes to pot, and all hell breaks loose. By itself,
it’ll happen with the radar, and you don’t even know about it. You don’t
have to. But if you want to predict it, you have to understand that, and to
this day, apertures bug electromagnetic theorists because all the
possibilities, things that can happen. And that’s why we sat there and
talked for hours that night, and these were all the smart guys in the
country. I wasn’t one of them, but you know somebody has to tell them,
well, here’s the problem, fellows. Not scattering from a surface. They
were good at that. Sorry.
00:46:48

Brown: As the basic knowledge of radar signature, these echoes, begin to
develop, at some point this begins to transition into the idea of applying
these theories to a complete vehicle, a complete airplane. When did that
transition begin to occur, and what was the motivation?

00:47:16

Bahret: Oh, I think motivation after a while was very clear. It became
obvious that classic design approaches, brute force techniques, did not
work. Vietnam was a case in point. We had the highest performance
aircraft. We had jammers, everything else. We had “Wild Weasels,” and
still we lost a lot of planes and a lot of people. And I had a friend named
Bill Eveston [name?], he’s dead now, but he used to head up the
Advanced Development Group in the lab for Electronic Warfare. Mostly
they were at the stage of building jammers and things like this that would
go on aircraft. And Bill and I used to give talks sometimes, and I’d get up
and tell them, “Well, folks, you know, if you reduce the echo of the
airplane by a factor of ten, which is relatively easy to do, even as a
retrofit,” I said, “that means you can reduce the size of the jammer by a
factor of ten.” That means you have a lot less weight, a lot less cost, a lot
less maintenance, and so forth and so on. And Bill Eveston [name?] used
to invariably stand up and say, “Bahret, you’re blowing smoke.” He said,
“If we had an aircraft that was ten times smaller,” he says, “I’d still use the
same jammer, except now it would be effective.”
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When those things began to sink in, I think people got very, very
serious about this. They realized what I said was true. It may cost you
more money in the design stages and everything in the first few aircraft or
whatever it is you’re building, but, my lord, you saved that money back
over the lifetime of the machine. I mean look at the F-117 as a case in
point, for God’s sakes. I mean, we lost one and that was an accidental
shot. Some guy, you know, they weren’t shooting at the airplane. They
were just shooting into the air, and the laws of physics say one of them is
bound to hit someday. That was the only one ever lost. And those things
were not, you know, some of those were not lost to the Russians. They
understood what they were up against now.
00:50:15

Brown: Let me ask you to amplify a little bit on the Air Force’s
experience in Southeast Asia, in Vietnam, and how it affected Air Force
thinking. Certainly that conflict created unanticipated demands on the Air
Force. It was a conflict quite unlike what had been anticipated for
Western Europe or a strategic conflict with the Soviet Union, and as you
suggested, the Air Force began to have real difficulties in accomplishing
their missions. Did that begin to, in itself, create demands for new
technology, and did the Cold War and the Soviet threat become lesser?
Was there a shift in emphasis?

00:51:10

Bahret: Oh, no, I think the thought was that the Cold War, if it became a
hot war, would be Vietnam squared. They would just have that many
more of the same threats. So anything that was done to improve things in
Vietnam would clearly help in the larger conflict.
One example—but, and this is I said early on, you know, when
things get tough, all of a sudden bureaucracies go away and all kinds of
good things happen in a hurry because everybody stands aside. Case in
point was the weapon that was used a lot in Vietnam, the anti-radiation
missile. There were two kinds. One was the Shrike and the other was
what they called the Standard ARM. These were the two missiles that
were commonly used. These missiles, if you don’t know, cost around four
hundred thousand dollars a piece. An anti-radiation missile has a very,
very small warhead. To do any damage, it really has to hit the target
straight on. I mean, for instance, a lot of times they would hit an antenna.
Well, the other guy just through another antenna on the radar, it was fine.
So then finally, the other guy learned, “Well, hey, you know, if I see one
coming, I just turn the radar off for a minute, it loses its guidance.” And
so we probably scare a few guys picking in the rice paddy next door, but
conflict-wise, we didn’t do anything. And so it turned out that the
effectiveness of these expensive anti-radiation missiles—thousands and
thousands of which were shot—was about four percent. Four percent of
them did any significant damage. Now, that’s pretty poor, okay. You
know, that’s like the command at Bunker Hill, “Don’t fire ‘til you see the
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white of their eyes,” and then half of the guys were blind and some of
them were cross-eyed and so forth, you know. Not very effective.
And so somebody came in, again, you know, no paperwork, no
nothing. “Bahret, we have a problem. Somehow or other, those guys
know we’re coming, and what can you do to help us?” And they said,
“What would you need to answer the question?” I said, “Well, for one
thing, we’d need a couple of missiles. One of each, you know. We have
to have something to study or measure.” They said, “You got it.” And
within a week, they ordered Texas Instrument who made the Shrike and
General Dynamics out in San Diego who made the Standard ARM, they
ordered them to run a production run, just keep one going down the line
except don’t put the warhead in it and don’t put the propellant in it. And
we had that, set it up on the range, measured it, and told them how to fix
the problem. And that took probably three weeks. Now in at normal
cycle, that’d take, if you did it in three years, you’d be lucky, you know.
But in those days, you needed it now, and it was a matter of saving lives,
you know. Drop your fork and get on with the job.
End of Video Tape 1
[not on video, but included in audio file]
00:55:05

Brown: Let me call a pause once again. We’ll take a, take a break for a
few minutes and, and then we’ll resume.

00:55:06

Bahret: Okay. ]

Start of Video Tape 2
00:00:00

Brown: Mr. Bahret, periodically the Air Force or other defense agencies,
or in some case our allies, would conduct a technology forecasting
exercise, an attempt to predict the future, an attempt to predict the role that
technology might have. Was signature technology ever considered in one
of those projects? And did you participate? And what was your
contribution?

00:00:31

Bahret: Yes, it certainly was. In fact, one of the biggest ones that NATO
ever had was a thing called Project 2000, and this took place in the late,
well, eighty-six, mid-1980s. I was assigned to that. It is a bit of a bitter
story from my wife’s viewpoint because it started in Paris in January of
the year, two days after we had a humongous snowstorm, and I left and
she was there standing with a snow shovel, which didn’t sit too well.
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But, yes, I was sent to participate in that. And some of those
problems got a little tricky because we didn’t share—and I suspect we still
don’t—everything we know. And so it became a little touchy sometimes
to say, “Well, boys.” They’d say, “Okay, what are we going to see in the
year 2000?” And I’d say, “You’re going to see low signature as a
requirement on all vehicles.” But, you see, you couldn’t elaborate. I
couldn’t give a course on that, because then you’re getting into touchy
ground and you had to ask— “Take my word for it, guys, and put it down
as a thing to worry about.”
Because it affects, you see, not only the offensive systems—
airplanes and ships—but the defensive systems that NATO was worrying
about—radars and everything else. And it’s a real problem to the radar
guy. I mean, there have been symposia, one I recall up at Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, where these people were talking about the design
of advanced radar systems. And they asked me to go up and tell them
about this stealth nonsense and how it affected them. And there were
times when they’d ask, “What can I do about our current operating
systems,” and I’d say, “Pray.” Because I think that’s one of the main
reasons, not the main reason, one of the big reasons that the Cold War
ended because the Russians, they knew they were dead in the water with,
you know, ten thousand or how many radars all over the place and none of
them could cope with this new threat. And they couldn’t afford to go back
and redesign those.
00:03:35

Brown: In the 1970s, the Air Force began to sponsor construction of
experimental vehicles, specifically to exploit new theories, new
knowledge of stealth technologies. Were you aware of this initiative?
Were you personally involved? Did you see this as a culmination of all of
the years of work assembling the basic knowledge of signature reduction?

00:04:08

Bahret: It certainly made me feel good, if that’s what you mean. Yes, I
was involved in almost every vehicle, exotic vehicle, you can think of,
starting with the U-2. Spent a lot of time out at the Skunk Works. Kelly
Johnson and I had many a strong debate over some of the techniques,
which he said would never work. But if you look at the F-117, you’ll find
out someone else at least disagreed with him.
One thing was windshield canopy coatings and things like that. It
became rather easy to come up with coatings you could put on windshields
and keep the energy from going in the cockpit, for instance, and reflecting
off things like the bulkhead and the pilot’s head and all other kinds of
dense objects. But Kelly didn’t think much of that idea. He said,
“Bahret,” he said, “you put that coating on there and the guy’s going to see
ten sets of instruments at night, because they reflect.” And I said, “Kelly,
go to the camera people and ask them about anti-reflective coatings and
put that over this other thing. I don’t care what you put over it. Just put
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this on there to begin with.” And eventually, again you asked before was
it tough to convince some of them, yes, it was.
But one of the interesting things which we haven’t talked about too
much, I’ve talked something about echo sources and how you might do
something about them and all. But that’s all well and good, but the most
powerful technique of all is shaping. And that’s where flight dynamics
people and the propulsion people and everybody else get in the act
because if you shape the thing properly, oh man, are you way ahead of the
game. Again, F-117 is the case in point. And that twists the
aerodynamics guys, the structures guys and other people out of their
normal routine because it’s back to the drawing boards now. We’ve got to
start over with some new stupid looking shape and make that fly. And
that’s sometimes more difficult that it appears.
00:07:01

Brown: I can assure you, coming from the flight dynamics viewpoint, it
was very difficult to accept. It was very hard to get used to this notion of
incorporating low-signature requirements into a vehicle, into the stealth
class of vehicles. It was a great challenge throughout the industry.

00:07:25

Bahret: Yes, well, it bothers me sometimes that the public, encouraged by
the media, get heartburn over the cost of some of these systems. But they
don’t understand for one minute what goes into making one of them. You
know, I take the people through the Air Force Museum a lot, and one of
the things I worked on—I won’t say helped design, but I was involved
with—was the SR-71. Well, most people don’t have the foggiest idea of
what went into the SR-71 design. I mean, and mind you we had to make
absorber materials that would stand up to these things. Most people, okay,
I tell them this. When this plane is flying at 75,000 feet at Mach 3, the
stagnation temperature—the temperature the surface arises—is 637
degrees Fahrenheit. Now, I said, you probably don’t know what 637
degrees Fahrenheit is. But, I say, go home, turn on your electric range and
when the burner gets red-hot, it’s around 637 degrees Fahrenheit.
Now, what does that tell us? Six-hundred thirty-seven degrees
Fahrenheit is far above the flash-point of any jet engine fuel. What does
that mean? It means when you get the plane up there cooking, it’s going
to explode, unless you make a fuel that can stand more than 637 degrees.
What else does it mean? It means that the tires on which the plane would
land would normally drip out of the wheel wells after a little while,
because it’s far above the melting point of rubber tires. So what? You
have to design tires that can stand 637 degrees. Fifty million dollars for
that airplane? You bet your booties! But, by George, if you didn’t do it,
the thing would never fly. And that’s what happens when you get into the
stealth design. You start having to make all these changes.

00:09:55

Brown: Let me shift slightly and, and ask you about the workforce within
the laboratories, your colleagues who worked here, and your relationship
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with the universities and the graduate programs there. The workforce at
Wright-Patterson is characterized by a rather unique blend of civilian
specialists and military officers. Did you find that to be a satisfactory
arrangement?
00:10:26

Bahret: Well, in the end, in accordance with the Peter Principle, where,
you know, you rise to your level of mediocrity, I was a branch chief, and I
had about fifty scientists and engineers working. A percentage of them
were military, and good technical people for the most part. But I always
had trouble with the notion of the military people in the labs. A good
example is most of the people they put in as lab chiefs--and I’m not saying
this to be nasty to anybody, please—but normally, the military had the
idea that any person could do any job, which I personally think is
nonsense. But they would grab someone of the proper rank and put them
in that chair. We had a brilliant guy. He had a Ph.D., but he was the head
of one of the most sophisticated electronics labs in the world. He had a
Ph.D. in aeronautical engineering. Well that was very nice, but he
couldn’t, he didn’t know a microwave from a permanent wave, and it just
doesn’t fit.
And personally, I like the way that most countries in the world do
it. They have a central research organization which serves all the services.
And military people can work there, but basically they have to take off
their uniform and become another worker-bee. And any of the services
who want work done there, they come in and they say, “Here, I’d like you
to do this.” And the guy says, “Well, okay, this is what it will cost.” And
they go at it like that. And the reason they do it is because so many of the
needs of the different services overlap, and so over here we have each
service with its own little laboratory duplicating all the time. And
personally I don’t think that’s smart.

00:13:12

Brown: What about the relationship with universities, engineering
departments within universities, their graduate programs.

00:13:22

Bahret: Well, I have to say we were very lucky. We, as I said before, we
had to get people who could do some of these problems for the length of
time that it takes. In other words, it was labor intensive, if you will. And
we didn’t have the people. So we went to these different universities to
get work done, and in the process, there were certain advantages that
accrued to the laboratory. For example, at Ohio State University, I
regularly used to get a list of the Ph.D. graduating class. And that let me
look over and get some of the better people, and I had some really good
people. I tell you I would stack my branch up against anybody. But it got
pretty bad after a while because, I don’t know what it is in this country,
but a lot of people are just not willing to work the way that some of the
people in other countries. One of the graduating classes in
electromagnetics from Ohio State University, out of thirty-three people,
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three were Americans. Now, why is that bad? Because I can’t hire the
other thirty. They don’t have clearances, and most of them couldn’t get
clearances. Three out of thirty, ten percent. Come on. We’re going to go
down the tubes if that keeps up for very long. But, it was an advantage to
know all these people.
I was also frequently on the team that was sent by the Personnel
Office to go up and recruit, and another opportunity to be a little selfserving. That was a lot of fun. I enjoyed that.
00:15:41

Brown: Mr. Bahret, if I could, some final reflections on the Cold War.
With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the final collapse of the Soviet
Union in 1992, all of that seemed to occur very quickly. And to many
individuals, it was a surprise. Did the conclusion of the Cold War, the end
of the Cold War, the swiftness with which it happened, did that surprise
you? Or had you foreseen some of these events?

00:16:18

Bahret: Well, of course I had no way of knowing when something like
that would happen, but we, again in my former life, I had opportunities
while I worked, as I told you, with the intelligence people an awful lot. In
fact, they used to ask us to do assessments of what we thought the Soviets
would be doing in a certain area, you know, in terms of, well, measuring.
Were they developing low cross-section vehicles? Well, you have to have
certain kinds of facilities to do that, and, if they’d give us photographs
taken even from satellites, you could tell from the design, the layout, and
everything else, you knew that that the facility did not have the ability to
even measure something that had very low echo because the supports and
everything were too big. You could tell from that.
Also, in my branch, I had one group that did foreign material
exploitation, which means by means of, by hook or by crook, we got a
hold of, somebody got hold of and brought us, Soviet equipment. And so
we had a bit of an idea of where they stood. And, I don’t know. I never
had the warm feeling as did a lot of people that they were, you know, the
ten-foot gorilla. They just didn’t have that power. I’m not saying they
were stupid or anything like that, but they just didn’t have the technology
edge that would keep them out front at all. And, to me, that said, you
know, the handwriting was on the wall. They just couldn’t keep going the
way they did. I mean, they did a job on the Germans in World War II, but
that was mainly because they sacrificed lives as if they didn’t matter.
They just, you know, if the Germans killed two hundred, they sent in two
thousand, and sure, you’re going to win like that. But attrition,
particularly if you get into a nuclear environment, attrition is going to beat
you every day.

00:19:08

Brown: And so in the decades then that we have come to think of as the
Cold War, and the ultimate outcome of it, how would you characterize the
significance of Wright Field, this large Air Force installation devoted to
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engineering, to technology, to the acquisition of future systems. How
would you describe the overall significance of this place during the Cold
War?
00:19:39

Bahret: Oh, I think it had a tremendous influence, because, again, the
technology in so many areas was being advanced. And from what we
could gather, the other guy wasn’t doing so well in some of these things.
And, I don’t want to say it’s all good news and bad news. For example, as
you know, all Air Force airplanes have to land on runways. No Soviet
airplanes have to land on runways. They’re all built to take off from a
field. It means a whole lot of differences in design, but I guess I think that
you can do more by taking off on a runway than you can on a field
because you can’t carry the payload, you can’t do this, that, and the other
thing off a dirt field. And so you know things like that. I think our
technology was just advancing so quickly, and, in that time, there were so
many planes on the drawing boards and everything that it seemed like we
were just destined to win.
I might also say that the Wright Field laboratories were not
restricted to Air Force things. Particularly in the signature area, we had
the good fortune to work on literally everything from submarines to
satellites, tanks, helicopters for the Army, ships for the Navy, submarines
for the Navy, satellites for the Air Force and others. And that made the
job a lot of fun, but it also meant that you could cross fertilize by using
something from here over here and so forth and so on, which was a big
advantage. Big advantage. And I think that also contributed. If you look,
for instance, at the design of any Navy ship, you will find that they no
longer have boxy sides, which we always wondered about. They used to
say, it’s against the law to give aid and comfort to the enemy, we’d
wonder why they’d build a ship like that? And they don’t any more. And
so, lessons learned.

00:22:45

Brown: As we close here, I’ll simply ask you if, on reflection of the
various topics we’ve covered this afternoon, is there anything that we have
failed to mention, any subject that we perhaps inadvertently skipped over,
something that you would like to add here as we close. If you want to take
a few moments to reflect.

00:23:13

Bahret: Well, I just wish that we could get into classified information,
because it’s some of the actual numbers that make you understand the
significance of some of the things I’ve talked about. I haven’t described
specifically how any technique, how much it reduces or anything like that,
but it in those numbers that you begin to realize the impact that this work
can have on system performance. And it’s profound, I mean, when you
can’t see the other guy. And it’s not matter of seeing him perfectly well.
To bring a missile to bear on a target, you have to have constant track.
You can’t have a track now and then a gap and then a track now. That

22 August 2006

20

Cold War Aerospace Technology Project

William F. Bahret

doesn’t work. You have to have a steady track while the missile is
guiding, otherwise it doesn’t know where to go. So, again, it’s the
numbers and things of that sort. There’s a lot that goes into these things.
I said before that shaping, for instance, was an important
parameter. It’s impossible to shape everything so that from any aspect
angle—top, bottom, side, or any—it’s invisible. You can’t do it. So what
you have to do, you have to go in there and study the bad guy and how he
operates and then see how he’s going to view you, and then worry about
those aspect angles which are most important. And a lot is involved in a
system design. You have to know how that system is going to operate in a
hostile environment, and it just gets all the more fascinating for working
with all the people who can do all these kinds of studies and see what you
can come up with. It’s a fascinating subject. I loved it.
00:25:40

Brown: Mr. Bahret, you’ve mentioned your participation in a NATO
exercise and some sharing of information with our allies in Western
Europe. There are other significant countries that also are involved in
military technology, one of those being the country of Sweden, not a
member of NATO, but clearly a country with very advanced technology.
Did you have an opportunity to work with the Swedes, with the Swedish
military establishments and their technology organizations?

00:26:22

Bahret: As a matter of fact, I did. It was out of the blue. You have to
understand that we were a small group, and we were the only game in
town. So anybody who anywhere wanted to know anything about this
basically came down and said, “Hey, can you help us a little bit?” So one
day I was called by the Pentagon, and they said, “We want you to go over
to Sweden and give them some technical advice on signature work
because we know they’re doing some of that.” And they sent a colonel
from the Pentagon along with us to baby-sit me so I didn’t say anything
wrong. And they said, “Just don’t go too far with what you say over
there.”
But basically it boiled down to, back in 1963, we were the first
technical support group from the United States to go over to Sweden to
help them. And, yes, they were not part of NATO, but I can tell you they
appreciated what we did so much that in a week’s time, they took us
through every one of their facilities, their underground bunkers. They
operated radars. They dropped chaff, and they did everything. They
showed us all they did. They were really open and above board.
But the week started with them getting up and we—the audience of
three, there was another major with us, he was from the countermeasures
group over at ASD—we three were the audience. And they paraded I
don’t know how many Swedish scientists and engineers up there, and they
talked on what they were doing, this, that, and the other thing. But it
turned out that I listened to my counterpart describe their work. They were
working on the Viggen, the Swedish aircraft, the Viggen. And, oh mercy,
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I felt, I didn’t know what to do. I nudged the colonel in the middle. I said,
“What do you want me to do? Obviously they are totally wrong. They’re
wasting their time and their money and everything.” He said, “Tell them.”
I said, “Yes, sir.” So next day, they said, “Okay, America, it’s your turn.”
We got up, and I started talking, because they scheduled the time we
would talk, and I started talking about where I thought they were, you
know, kind of like I said, well, I didn’t mind you thinking, but I didn’t
much like what you thought. And we went from there. And I told them
where they were wrong, and how to do it right, and so forth. Well, by the
end of that day, the auditorium was filled. I don’t know how many
people, two hundred people or something sitting there, waiting to hear
how they should be doing business on these things. And they were let me
say extremely grateful. They put on a dog and pony show the rest of the
week that I could not believe. We had our own aircraft with crews to fly
us around to the different bases and everything of this sort. It was—and,
oh, we never had a lunch or dinner that wasn’t hosted by a general
officer—it was quite an experience.
But we had other opportunities that were, again being the only
game in town, I was constantly—I was on that P-2000 study I mentioned
for NATO, but I was also put on an A-Guard lecture series on radar echo,
and that went from place to place. Again, the people in Europe who get
on these committees, they like to travel. And I mean you wind up all over
the place. This radar echo lecture series, there were probably, oh, ten of
us, I guess, and it was a three-day lecture series. And we went from, God
where all, we were down in Munich, we were up in London. Oh, that was
funny because they had us in the zoo, and then people thought that was an
appropriate place for you nuts. And we went to Norway. The Norway
people were the smartest, because you see, they paid for this lecture series
no matter where it was. I didn’t get any money, but somebody did. And
the Norwegians, they put us in a place called Bolkesjo, which you
probably haven’t visited recently. It is in the wintertime a ski resort way
out in the mountains near where the Germans had that heavy water plant
out there. And it’s beautiful country, except it’s so far out in
nowheresville that there was no one left the place at night. And they loved
it because here they were, they had all the speakers captive, and all they
had to do was buy you a big orange, and you’d talk for another hour, and
they had free lectures all night long. We had one of the guys was even
sitting in the swimming pool, and the people in the pool were asking him
questions. But, you know, those things were fun experiences I have to
say. And I think it influenced people, too. They had an awful lot of good
questions, those folks, because again they didn’t have the research
facilities or the money to do all these things. And this was an opportunity
for them to save a lot of money, to get it for free.
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00:32:59

Brown: Now you mentioned the trips to Europe, the trips to Sweden, were
there reciprocal visits? Were there professional relationships that
continued afterwards with individuals coming over here?

00:33:11

Bahret: Oh, indeed. In fact, in many of these places, after they learned of
some of the facilities we have here, they would get money and bring
models over or anything to have them measured or so forth. And then
when they finished doing that, they’d come by Wright Field and show me
the data and say, “What do you think?” So they got a lot of free help, I
can tell you. But, you know, our government thought that was great. I
guess the State Department has as much to do with some of these things as
we do. And I’ll tell you a story. My wife is deceased now, but a friend I
met over there in Europe—my counterpart in Sweden—was a guy named
Pere Erik Jung [name?] and he also liked to travel. And so he came over
here all the time, and at the time, you know, in the ‘60s, I don’t know if
any of you had the pleasure of going to Sweden, it’s a beautiful place, but
you can’t afford it. It’s terribly expensive. In the ‘60s, steak in Sweden
cost $25 a pound. So what my friend Jung would do, he would be out in
say L.A. and coming back through here on his way back to Sweden. He’d
call my wife, and he’d say, “Jo, can you get me some steaks?” And she
had a regular routine. She’d go up to the meat cutter, and she’d get him
one inch steaks. And it turned out, if we froze them, wrapped them in
newspaper, put them in plastic bags, and he put them in his suitcase, they
would still be frozen when they got to Sweden. And so we had a regular
thing going there, where’d she’d get him a dozen steaks or something like
that, and we were paying, you know, two or three dollars a pound maybe,
and he was saving $22 dollars a pound or something. And, yes, lot of
good things. Not a lot of people we work with from England of course,
we shared a lot of stuff with them.
I haven’t mentioned though that in working in signature, it doesn’t
always mean you’re trying to reduce it. Camouflage in nature means
blending in with the background. The animals know this. So you really
don’t always want to make something zero echo. If you made a tank zero,
for instance, on the ground it would stand out like a black hole. It would
be just as obvious as if you left it alone in the first place. So it’s like I said
about Professor Harold Hill, you better know the territory. And so we
spent a lot of time trying to go the other way, and increase echo. Why?
The greatest, most effective counter-measure to an enemy defense is
saturation. If you present him with a lot of targets, and he can’t tell them
one from the other, he’s either going to spend the gross national product in
one attack trying to shoot down the one real plane among fifty decoys, or
he’s going to lose. The plane’s going to get to him. So we tried to make
devices, echo enhancement we called them, that we could put on small
decoys or drones or something like that and you just send them in willynilly and let the other fellow figure it out if he could. And this works, by
the way, again, ground, air, and in the satellites, everywhere it works. It’s
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beautiful, and it’s just kind of amazing how many things you can do for a
few bucks that costs the other guy millions to counter. It’s an interesting
game.
00:38:06

Brown: Is that basic strategy applicable to the Navy, to seagoing vessels
as it is to airborne systems?

00:38:18

Bahret: Well, it’s tougher because the Navy vessels generally have much
larger echo to contend with, but, yes, the Navy has, as a matter of fact,
they use decoys all the time as a counter-measure to anti-ship missiles and
all, sea-skimming missiles and everything that come in and whomp the
ship. They use decoys as a way to pull them away from the real target.
But again you see the Navy ships have much, much higher cross-sections
than we have to contend with in the Air Force, so it’s a little different.
But, they do that sort of thing all the time. Of course, one of the best
examples of it was the Israeli attack in the Baca Valley years ago, when
they wiped out the other guy’s Air Force in a day or two, using decoys to
get their missiles in the air and expended. Then they’d go in and attack
after the missiles were used. Yes, it’s a very powerful technique, and it’s
cost effective. These things that I’m talking about are small, you know.
They may only be three or four feet long, and maybe a few inches in
diameter, but they look like a big airplane. And the other fellow has a
problem. And they’re easy to build.

00:39:54

Brown: Mr. Bahret, you’ve mentioned your travels, both overseas, here
within the United States. You’ve mentioned how individuals come from
everywhere to Wright Field. They came to visit your facilities. You went
to other places to give lectures and to talk. In that process, undoubtedly,
you met many notable personalities, some at high levels of government,
others perhaps in industry. Do you recall any specific individual that you
thought was very influential, or had insight into how the United States
should pursue stealth technology?

00:40:40

Bahret: Oh, that’s a very hard question because it was always one of the
delights of my life to be in a position of meeting and working with so
many, many fine people. Again being the only game in town, you know, I
got places where a lot of other people did not. And, I gave a talk in the
White House one time, and I gave a talk to LeMay when he was the Chief
of Staff and all this kind of stuff. I don’t belong in those places, you
know, but it would be hard to put my finger on any particular individual.
It’s kind of interesting, the guy who was the vice president of Northrop
and who was the chief designer of the B-2, he used to come to The Barn
frequently and he’d say, “Bill, do you mind if I just sit here and take notes
on how you guys do things and what you do, and so forth and so on.”
John Cashen was his name. I said, “Be my guest, John, just don’t get the
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way when I’m doing something. That’s all.” He said, “I won’t.” But, you
know, you meet all kinds of fabulous people. It just makes life interesting.
00:42:02

Brown: Mr. Bahret, thank you for your time your this afternoon. We’ve
appreciated all that you’ve told us. We will now bring this interview to a
close.

00:42:12

Bahret: Thank you, sir. Thank you for the opportunity.

End of Video Tape Two.
End of Interview
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